Chapter 17: What You Have to Believe
Facts and Opinions
Before summing up, one thing needs to be said plainly, so that nothing in this book is misread.
None of it is a complaint against science, or against scientists. Science has done more good than any other human enterprise — more understanding of the world, more practical progress — even if the same power has brought dangers of its own, nuclear weapons among them. Most scientists are people trying to understand the world and make it better, and they deserve to be treated that way.
But this whole book depends on a distinction: the facts science establishes are one thing, and the opinions scientists hold about what those facts mean are another. Training in science qualifies someone to gather and measure facts with a rigor most of us can't match. It does not make every interpretation of those facts correct. Interpretation is a separate act, and it is shaped by the interpreter — by prior assumptions, by which explanations feel satisfying, by what a whole field had committed itself to before the newest evidence came in. The history of science is a long record of confident interpretations overturned by later evidence. Someone who has spent a career on a subject may well reason about it better than most people; that doesn't make the conclusion right just because an expert reached it. Nor is drawing conclusions from facts reserved for people with science degrees.
All of this applies to me with exactly the same force. I have tried throughout to keep the two apart — to give checkable numbers as numbers, and to say so whenever I moved from a fact to my own reading of it. But the reading is mine, and having argued it at length doesn't make it any more likely to be right.
Last revised 2026-11-19