Evolution and Arithmetic

Chapter 17: What You Have to Believe

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A Rule of Method, or a Claim About Everything?

Some scientists would object to the question this book has been asking. In their view it isn't a fair question at all, because nothing beyond ordinary natural processes is available to be considered, under any circumstances. That objection comes in two forms, and they need to be told apart, because only one of them holds up.

The first is a practical rule. Science, as a method, restricts itself to natural causes, because otherwise it couldn't work as a discipline: there would be no way to investigate, test, or build on anything. That's a reasonable rule for conducting an investigation, and plenty of scientists hold it comfortably while believing, in their own lives, that more exists than the method can capture. But a rule for doing science tells you nothing about what is true. It describes the limits of one method. On its own, it can't rule anything in or out about reality.

The second is a much stronger claim: that nothing exists, or could exist, beyond what that method can measure and observe — that the natural world, defined this way, is the whole of reality. That is a substantial position about the nature of existence, and it should be recognized for what it is: an opinion, not a finding. Nobody has demonstrated it. It isn't clear what evidence could demonstrate it, or how anyone would know if it were false.

This book won't try to settle that deeper question. But it's worth naming plainly, because the second claim is sometimes presented as though it were itself a result of science, rather than a belief some scientists hold alongside their science. It should be weighed, and can be disagreed with, on the same footing as any other opinion in this book — including mine.

Last revised 2026-11-19

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